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Economic Development in Buffalo: Community,
Change and Fragmentation
SUSAN C. TURNER*
T HE city of Buffalo is in the midst of change. Many of these changes
can be measured by declines in population, in jobs, and in income.
The large population exodus that has occurred in Buffalo (the city lost
over 32% of its residents from 1960 to 1980)' was a result of, and in turn
has created changes in, the economic, demographic, and political compo-
sition of the city. Any resident of or visitor to Buffalo, however, can see
that many aspects of the city appear to have improved in the past ten
years. There is, for example, a new face for downtown, a new rapid
transit system, and new housing and commercial structures can be seen
along the city's waterfront.
This article will focus on how key local organizations have at-
tempted to respond to these recent changes, and how they, in turn, have
created new changes in Buffalo through economic development strategies
and programs. Discussion will begin with a short overview of local
demographics and economic trends in a national context, followed by a
sketch of selected local programs and projects, and will then review the
decision-making processes that have put these plans into place. I will end
by raising questions and concerns that need to be addressed before imple-
menting future economic development actions.
I. CHANGE IN BUFFALO: WHO COMPRISES THE
BUFFALO COMMUNITY?
The absolute decline in Buffalo's population started in the 1950's,
even though it began to stagnate at a much earlier time. From 1930 to
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Buffalo and other locations as a community organizer, a planner with the City of Buffalo's Depart-
ment of Community Development, and as a consultant with Cannon Design, Inc. She also served as
Senior Associate with the Greater Buffalo Development Foundation and is currently pursuing a
Ph.D. in Urban Planning at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, with a focus on urban poverty
issues.
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1950, the city's population increased by only one percent. From 1960 to
1980, the population declined precipitously from 532,759 to 357,870 per-
sons - a drop of 32.8%.2 This loss is a regional phenomenon, as op-
posed to a simple shift of the population from the city to the suburbs.
Between 1970 and 1980, the eight-county Western New York region ex-
perienced one of the most dramatic losses of population of any major
industrial region in the country, dropping 5.3%.3 Recent census data
predict additional regional losses.4
An important issue which emerges from these population changes is
the characteristics of those who will remain in Buffalo. The New York
State Department of Commerce predicts that Western New York will
lose an additional 107,000 people in the 15-24 age group by the year
2000.1 These persons constitute a significant component of the labor
force. It is also predicted that by the century's end, 60% of the popula-
tion will be over the age of thirty; the median age will be 40 and those
over age 65 will increase by 28%, to make up 16% of the region's popu-
lation.6 Most of this demographic restructuring will occur in the city of
Buffalo.7
Thus, a large and diverse labor pool - once a key asset of the area
is currently diminishing in size and is becoming characterized by
older workers who are less able to adapt to future technologies. The
aging of the population also implies an increased dependence on transfer
payments in the form of social security benefits. A compelling statistic is
that by the year 2000, those over the age of 65 will outnumber those
between the ages of 15 and 24.1 In addition, Buffalo's black population
has increased dramatically since 1960; the vast majority of those leaving
the region have been white. The city of Buffalo's population is now over
25% black and is the home of most of the region's black residents.9
Another important demographic change is the percentage of city
residents living below the poverty line. The number of city residents liv-
ing below the poverty level was more than ,twice that of the surrounding
region in 1979 (the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, or SMSA, as
2. Id.
3. Id. at 8.
4. See, e.g., Sack, Who Stands to Lose? Political Figuring Starts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1990, at
B5, col. 5.
5. CENTER FOR REGIONAL STUD., supra note 1, at 9.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 11.
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defined as Erie and Niagara Counties), and the percentage of these poor
residents increased over 50% between 1969 and 1979, to 17% of all fami-
lies."0 Furthermore, the median income of city residents (measured in
constant dollars since 1967) has declined at a rate exceeding that of the
SMSA median family income: the median income in the city of Buffalo
in 1980 was $15,432, compared to $20,704 for the larger SMSA. 1
Influencing these poverty figures are the number of unemployed.
Until 1980, the unemployment rate in Buffalo was about the same as the
unemployment rate in the surrounding region. From 1970-1980, how-
ever, the unemployment rate was 3.5% higher (9.5% for the SMSA com-
pared to 13.1% for the city).12 In addition, the unemployment rate
disproportionately affects blacks. The number of unemployed black
males increased over 112% between 1960 and 1980, and the increase in
unemployment for black women was 23%.13
The above data indicate that the city's population is declining and is
structurally changing. Those residents who remain are older, poorer,
less well educated, and more likely to be part of a minority group. It is
my contention that successful economic development policies are to im-
prove the standard of living for all Buffalo residents. To ensure that the
city as a whole is to remain both economically and socially viable the
needs of this current and future population are paramount. Past and cur-
rent economic development projects, and future plans, must be assessed
in the context of the needs and aspirations of Buffalo's population as it is.
Successful economic development serves who is here, not some vision of
a perfect population that some policy-makers hope to attract.
II. ECONOMIC CHANGES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: BUFFALO
IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT
Nationally, and increasingly internationally, determined economic
policy has clear ramifications for municipalities. Cities are now in the
position of being increasingly sensitive and responsive to changes in na-
tional (and international) economic trends, but are yet unable to affect
national policy directly. The result has been an erosion of local self-de-
termination and increasing competition among municipalities for both
federal funds and private capital investment.14 This process has been
10. Id. at 11.
11. Id. at 47.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Barnekov & Rich, Privatism and the Limits of Local Economic Development Policy, 25 URB.
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characterized as growing out of a federal policy which promoted the no-
tion that "limited public resources would have the greatest impact if they
were used as leverage to stimulate greater amounts of private invest-
ment." 5 National policy, expressed through shrinking availability of
federal dollars for urban programs, has created " 'subnational mercantil-
ism,' the establishment of a market of completing local and state govern-
ments selling their various economic development programs to American
and foreign businesses." 16
National economic changes and the resultant competition among
cities for elusive dollars have disturbing consequences for distressed cities
such as Buffalo. 7 One such consequence is that scare public resources
are spent on making the city look more "attractive" to potential inves-
tors. Buffalo's city government has spent millions in federal and local
funds to create a new face for downtown: a theater district and a baseball
stadium were recently completed. 8 Downtown's Fountain Plaza, fin-
ished in 1984, which included a new Hyatt Hotel, as well as headquarters
for the locally-based Goldome and Norstar banks, was partially funded
through a 22 million dollar Urban Development Action Grant
("UDAG"). 19 It was President Carter who initiated the UDAG pro-
gram, a private-sector-led version of urban renewal that won strong sup-
port from big-city mayors and downtown business interests.20
In 1989, the old Sibley's department store in downtown Buffalo was
converted into high-rent office and retail space, and the new Key Bank
headquarters building is now under construction with the help of multi-
million dollar UDAGs.21 These projects, and others like them, were
completed, and similar new projects are being proposed, such as the cur-
rent city, state and private sector focus on attracting funding for the
Ann. Q., 212, 213 (1989); DiGaetano, Urban Regime Formation: A Study in Contrast, 11 J. URn.
Ann., 261, 264 (1989).
15. Barnekov & Rich, supra note 14, at 213.
16. Fainstein & Fainstein, The Ambivalent State: Economic Development Policy in the U.S. Fed-
eral System Under the Reagan Administration, 25 URn. Ann. Q., 41, 42 (1989).
17. See generally Barnekov & Rich, supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., Grant, Rich Stadium Costing County $1 Million a Year, The Buffalo News, Apr. 9,
1985, at B1, col. 2; Turner, US. Approves Grant for Downtown Project, The Buffalo News, June 1,
1985, at Al, col. 4.
19. See, e.g., Turner, While Buffalo Dawdles, UDAG is Threatened with Extinction, The Buffalo
News, June 22, 1987, at C3, col. 2.
20. Fainstein & Fainstein, supra note 16, at 44.
21. See, e.g., Stouffer, Ex-Sibley's Filled Up as Office Space, The Buffalo News, Nov. 30, 1989, at
B9, col. 2; Turner, House, Senate Schedule Votes on Grants Eyed for Project Here, The Buffalo News,
June 22, 1988, at B1, col. 4.
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World University Games in Buffalo.22 This development is being com-
pleted without any formal attempt to realistically assess whether or not
such costly projects are helpful in attracting new firms or creating stable,
well-paying jobs to the city of Buffalo.2"
When I worked as downtown planner for the Greater Buffalo Devel-
opment Foundation ("GBDF") from 1987-1989, a private-sector funded,
local economic development organization, the emphasis of the organiza-
tion was on the creation of an "upscale" downtown. At one point, the
key focus of a downtown retail strategy, which included the creation of a
two million dollar retail loan fund, was to attract just one store to Buffalo
- Brooks Brothers. Store representatives were wined, dined, and sent
love letters from local holders of Brooks Brothers credit cards. It was as
if new businesses would flock to downtown Buffalo if only the city sold
the right suit!
Never mind the impression that persistently empty storefronts make
- let them stay empty until the "right" tenant is found. Three years
later, GBDF's retail loan fund has yet to make a single loan - can any
interested retailer meet such standards? City-sponsored plans are still in
place for the construction of an upscale waterfront "festival market-
place" (although the term is eschewed after the failures of such Boston
and Baltimore-inspired projects in other very cold-climate cities), if only
more funds and potential tenants can be found.
Buffalo has often looked to Baltimore as the quintessential example
of how a new face for a downtown is a good thing for a city. This inspi-
ration comes despite a number of recent studies that have shown that
Baltimore's economic indicators continue to decline (they are surpris-
ingly similar to Buffalo's), and social problems are on the rise, in the
wake of the implementation of a myriad of "successful" downtown
projects. The benefits of such projects are not spread throughout the
local economy.24
Programs to make a municipality more "attractive" as part of a new
era of "municipal mercantilism," involving the figurative (and often lit-
eral) selling of a city to potential investors, means that scarce resources
are used to embark on programs simply because other cities are similarly
22. See, e.g., Linstedt, Games Panel Maps $41 Million Funding Effort, The Buffalo News, Oct.
4, 1989, at B5, col. 3.
23. The completion of an impartial, cost-benefit analysis may be helpful in undertaking such an
assessment. See, eg., Fairbanks, City Development Plan Sets New Priorities: Business Coalition Puts
1990 Emphasis on Trade with Canada, World Games, The Buffalo News, Dec. 26, 1989, at B1, col. 1.
24. Barnekov & Rich, supra note 14, at 228.
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engaged - whether or not these programs make sense in either their
original locale, or for the new city that seeks them.25
Thus many cities like Buffalo, in response to national economic re-
structuring, often seek federal funds and investment dollars regardless of
whether a particular program is appropriate for the area, or whether the
ultimate local cost in securing the program exceeds the benefits that will
be derived from it. In Buffalo, an excellent example of competing for and
capturing federal funds for a program that far exceeds the city's ability to
pay for it is Buffalo's 600 million dollar Light Rail Rapid Transit System
("LRRT"). This boondoggle recently resulted in the shutting down of
the entire mass transportation system in Buffalo for lack of a source of
on-going dedicated funding.26 This program was implemented because
the federal government was only funding transportation "demonstra-
tion" projects. Funds could only be employed for innovative uses and
not for traditional mass transit (such as improving already existing bus
transportation). These funds were available for start-up capital and
other related planning costs; no operation or maintenance funds were
forthcoming.27 The present system was built with short-term criteria (it
looks like something is happening, i.e., the creation of construction jobs)
and without a clear analysis of long-term costs, which, as is painfully
obvious now, are substantial.28
In this atmosphere of "subnational mercantilism" Buffalo's local de-
velopment officials fail to determine whether economic benefits are equi-
tably distributed, or worse yet, whether there are benefits to anyone at
all. Federal UDAG funds have a stated goal that they should be used to
create jobs and benefit low income residents. The primary rationale for
the use of such funds for the Fountain Plaza project (which utilized 22
million dollars in UDAG funds for the construction of two bank build-
ings and a hotel) was that not only would this development create jobs, it
would, and perhaps more importantly in terms of stated objectives of this
program, help develop low income housing.29 The problem with this de-
velopment, as well as most of our economic development ventures, is that
25. Id. at 216.
26. Linstedt & McCarthy, NFTA Proposes to Shut Down Transit; Gorski Proposes Reorganiza-
tion, 11-Point Plan Includes Cuts, Manager Selected by Governor, The Buffalo News, Mar. 29, 1990,
at Al, col. 3.
27. Staff Conclusions and Recommendations, Evaluation of Transit Alternatives: Buffalo-Am-
herst Corridor (1973) (available from the author).
28. Area Committee for Transit, Activities Report (April 28, 1975) (available from the author).




there is no accountability. We do not know how many and what type of
jobs were created. We do not know to whom the created jobs went. City
residents? Suburban residents? And what about the appropriateness of
the use of these public funds? Goldome Bank used federal funds to build
its new headquarters. It then promptly leased out this space, at very high
rents, instead of using the space to house its own workers, who are pres-
ently spread out in older buildings throughout the city. Even if such
actions (and profits) are allowable under program guidelines, do they
make sense for the residents of the city of Buffalo?
Worse yet, the loan paybacks from the entire project, intended for
low income housing, went instead to the construction of Buffalo's down-
town baseball stadium.30 This diversion of "trickle-down" benefits is
particularly compelling in light of what many urban analysts consider
the Reagan administration's "most devastating action" - the elimina-
tion of new commitments for the construction of subsidized housing, a
federal responsibility for almost a half century.31
Another disturbing aspect of local economic development is that
these initiatives almost always involve great and often unexpected costs
to the community. These costs occur through overruns, unanticipated
consequences, and demands from developers for continued incentives
such as tax abatements. Both expected and unexpected local costs for
economic development programs mean that local dollars are then di-
verted from city coffers. These funds could go to support schools, hous-
ing, transportation, parks, infrastructure, and human service programs
that are set up to truly serve all the residents of a city like Buffalo.32
What good are the millions of dollars spent on development projects
in the name of improving Buffalo's image and making it more attractive
to firms? What good is any job-creation endeavor if its costs create a
situation in which the city cannot provide the basic services to assure
that people will be able to get to these jobs, or even to the schools that
prepare our youth for these jobs? Thus, as Barnekov and Rich
emphasize:
Economic development projects that focus on property enhancement have a
place in the process of urban regeneration, and sometimes they have mobil-
ized substantial private capital and produced dramatic results. But even
when these projects change the physical and commercial face of a city, they
do not necessarily create general benefits for the community. Proponents
30. Id.
31. Fainstein & Fainstein, supra note 16, at 48.
32. See Barnekov & Rich, supra note 14, at 225.
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point to new jobs and increased economic activity, but even when economic
growth occurs, large segments of the urban population - particularly ra-
cial minorities, the poor, and the unemployed - are often not among the
beneficiaries.
33
III. WHO MAKES COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
DECISIONS?
Economic development decision-making has historically been a
rather removed and undemocratic process of deal-making between local
government and business interests.34 National economic restructuring
and the resultant competition between cities has heightened and even in-
stitutionalized this secrecy.3" For example, federal funds are captured
and distributed by the city through private corporations such as Down-
town Development Inc. These corporations are set up as a part of city
government, yet they maintain privileges reserved for private corpora-
tions; their actions are carefully protected from public scrutiny. The pub-
lic has no prerogative to determine how much funds these corporations
have received, how much money they have spent, who has received
funds, and what criteria are used for funding allocation and to measure
success. How much money does the city now have in accounts held by
these corporations? No one seems to know, and no one is telling if they
do.
Even a number of the key members of Buffalo's local business com-
munity do not believe economic development money is adequately dis-
tributed.36 Thus Buffalo has recently witnessed the formation of the
"Group of Eighteen" (now known as the "Group of Nineteen"), com-
prised of Buffalo's self-appointed key business players (and the president
of the University at Buffalo) to create a new direction and establish pri-
orities for this city that are often different from those espoused by the
Mayor.
37
1988 saw the initial formulation of the Greater Buffalo Economic
Development Strategy Agenda. Who participated? The Economic De-
velopment Coordinating Committee, or "gang of six," as they called
themselves, was comprised of the heads of the Greater Buffalo Develop-
ment Foundation, the Western New York Economic Development Cor-
33. Barnekov & Rich, supra note 14, at 229.
34. See generally STONE & HEYWOOD, THE POLITICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 10 (1987).
35. Barnekov & Rich, supra note 14, at 223.





poration, The Erie County Industrial Development Agency, the Niagara
Frontier Transportation Authority, the Chamber of Commerce, and
SUNY Buffalo."8 The Committee then expanded to eleven members in
response. to strong criticism from the Buffalo community and the sur-
rounding region regarding the composition of the committee, which was
made up entirely of white males, as well as in response to the programs
they espoused.39 The eleven member committee now includes represent-
atives from the City of Buffalo and the Town of Amherst.' Two women
were appointed to the committee in 1989; the first member of a minority
group was finally appointed in the spring of 1990.41
I see the creation of this strategy as an excellent first step for Buf-
falo. Development plans made in private between local government and
business interests are now at least packaged and presented in public. The
strategy exists for public comment and response; it lays the groundwork
for other plans to be made. As one black leader stated:
We have to now have our own vision of what Greater Buffalo ought to look
like in the year 2000 and beyond. The white community has groups to
articulate their vision. If we are to succeed, we have to do the same thing.
42
The makers of the Greater Buffalo Economic Development Strategy
Agenda are not hardhearted, but may be short-sighted. Plans made in
private, by a few, are constrained by the vision and priorities of these few.
The results of non-participatory decision-making, coupled with increased
inter-city competition for declining resources, have encouraged decision-
makers to look away from this city's unique strengths and assets, the
strength and potential of our existing population, as well as its unique
needs.
IV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH
There is an overwhelming belief among decision-makers and among
many residents, that development - any development - is a good thing.
Mayors love to see a shovel in the ground. People tend to be impressed
38. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (EDCC), WORKING TOGETHER:
1990 GREATER BUFFALO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AGENDA (1990).
39. See Fairbanks, Agenda Slights Blacks, Niagara County, Critics Charge, The Buffalo News,
May 8, 1988, at A14, col. 1.
40. Id.
41. Panel discussion on "Community Capacity and Buffalo's Future," Buffalo Change & Com-
munity Conference (April 6, 1990) (Audio and Video tape on file at the Charles B. Sears Law Li-
brary, University at Buffalo).
42. Lacey, Black in Buffalo 1988/25 Years After the Dream: Prognosis Mixes Gloom, Hope, The
Buffalo News, Nov. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
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by visible activity: homes built on the waterfront, new office buildings
downtown, a high-tech corridor, a shiny rapid transportation system. It
is true that Buffalo, a distressed city, like any city, needs an influx of
capital to survive. It needs economic development.
Economic development, however, which improves the standard of
living for the broadest possible sector of a city's population, cannot be
created through glitzy image-enhancing projects, or bribes to keep busi-
nesses, or attempts to keep businesses technologically competitive. There
are other ways to invest, and recent studies demonstrate that investment
in our population - in our "human capital" - may prove far more
beneficial to far more people over a far longer period of time than the
projects discussed so far.43 A well-educated and skilled workforce will
do more to attract and retain firms than the development of upscale retail
stores downtown. A recent research effort, which compares both "cost-
minimization strategies" (approaches to minimize out-of-the pocket ex-
penses to existing and sought-after firms, such as UDAGs and other in-
centives, like tax abatements) to "human capital" strategies in 44
southern SMSA's, confirm the economic and social superiority of the lat-
ter approach.44
Good schools, housing, transportation, and health and human serv-
ices are not as striking as a baseball stadium or the World University
Games, but they will do more to attract people as residents, not just as
visitors, and keep people and business in Buffalo. Most importantly, in-
creased direct investment in our existing assets - our people, as well as
the programs and services they need, such as quality schools, job train-
ing, housing and transportation - will also in themselves improve this
city's overall standard of living.
V. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
My conclusion is that most changes created by local development
programs have not positively affected the majority of residents of the city
of Buffalo. If there is a positive impact, it has benefited only a small
segment of the city's population. Current strategies and plans do not
adequately address the unique needs and characteristics of this city; most
projects and the processes that put them in place illustrate, and perhaps
even increase, fragmentation in Buffalo's community.
Economic development actions should improve the standard of liv-
43. Wamer, Alternative Strategies for Economic Development, 25 URB. AFF. Q., 390 (1989).
44. Id. at 389-408.
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ing for all members of Buffalo's community - black and white, young
and old, rich and poor. An improved standard of living is a key determi-
nant of how successful economic development actions are measured by a
variety of indicators. Therefore, when looking at the number of jobs and
people employed, one must also take into account other indicators, such
as job quality, a notion which includes decent wages and benefits, and job
stability. Housing quality is another measure, as is the quality of public
education and transportation.
Residents of distressed cities such as Buffalo need not be helpless in
the face of profound national and international economic trends and lo-
cal political machinations. Residents can benefit from and continue a
process of community education, which can include learning about Buf-
falo's particular problems and needs and how they fit into national and
international trends, as well as how other groups and organizations are
successfully (and unsuccessfully) addressing similar issues in comparable
areas.
I'm convinced that the actors that have so far contributed to Buf-
falo's economic development agenda are reachable and can be persuaded
to make economic changes that will positively affect all of Buffalo's resi-
dents. Local residents, through a process of community education, or-
ganization and participation, can cooperatively create an environment
where economic development goals reflect broad input and foster a more
equitable distribution of benefits. Development forces can be challenged
from the bottom up - people can capture control over the places in
which they live and critically judge the value of what they make and the
community conditions under which they produce it. 5 An educated, or-
ganized and vocal constituency can step into Buffalo's decision-making
process; it can make a difference.
45. Vogel & Swanson, The Growth Machine Versus the Antigrowth Coalition: The Battle for our
Communities, 25 URn. AFF. Q., 65 (1989).
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